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Introduction
 
When the players of a noncooperative game have the opportunity to communicate prior to play, 
they will try to reach an agreement to coordinate their actions in a mutually beneficial way. The 
aim of this paper is to characterize the set of agreements that the players may reach. Since we 
consider situations where agreements are non-binding, only those agreements that are not subject 
to viable (i.e., self-enforcing) deviations are of interest. As pre-play communication allows the 
players to correlate their play, we take the set of all correlated strategies as the space of feasible 
agreements. We characterize the set of coalition-proof equilibria as the set of agreements from 
which no coalition has a self-enforcing deviation making all its members better off. 
Admitting correlated strategies as feasible agreements alters the set of coalition-proof equilibria 
of a game in a fundamental way (viz., no inclusion relationship between the notion of coalition­
proofness that we propose and others previously introduced is to be found). In fact, there are games 
where the only plausible agreements are correlated (and not mixed) agreements. We provide 
examples with this feature and we show that the notion of coalition-proof equilibrium that we 
propose identifies these agreements. Unfortunately, as with other notions of coalition proofness 
previously introduced, existence of an equilibrium cannot be guaranteed. We are able to show, 
however, that if there is a correlated strategy which (i) has a support contained in the set of 
actions that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, and (ii) weakly Pareto 
dominates every other correlated strategy whose support is contained in that set, then this strategy 
is a coalition-proof equilibrium. Consequently, the unique equilibrium of a dominance solvable 
game is coalition-proof. 
Other authors have explored the implications of pre-play communication when agreements are 
mixed strategy profiles. Aumann [1] introduced the notion of strong Nash equilibrium, which 
requires that an agreement not be subject to an improving deviation by any coalition of players. 
This requirement is too strong, since agreements must be resistant to deviations which are not 
themselves resistant to further deviations. Recognizing this problem, Bernheim, Peleg and Whin­
ston [3] (henceforth referred to as BPW) introduced the notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium 
(CPNE), which requires only that an agreement be immune to improving deviations which are 
self-enforcing. A deviation is self-enforcing if there is no further self-enforcing and improving de­
viation available to a proper subcoalition of players. This notion of "self-enforcingness" provides 
a useful means of distinguishing coalitional deviations that are viable from those that are not re­
I 
sistant to further deviations. Only viable deviations can upset potential agreements. A deficiency 
of CPNE, however, is that it does not allow players to agree to correlate their play. 
Although the possibility that players correlate their actions when given the opportunity to 
communicate was recognized as early as in Luce and Raiffa [7], only recently did Einy and Peleg [4] 
(E&P) introduce a concept of coalition-proof communication equilibrium. The difference between 
E&P's notion and ours can be better understood if we assume that correlated agreements are 
carried out with the assistance of a mediator. The mediator selects an action profile according to 
the agreement and then makes a (private and non-binding) recommendation of an action to each 
player. 
E&P consider situations where the players may plan deviations only after receiving recommen-
dations. In our framework, however, players plan deviations before receiving recommendations, 
and no further communication is possible after recommendations are issued. This difference man-
ifests itself most clearly in two-person games where an agreement is coalition-proof in our sense 
only if it is Pareto efficient within the set of correlated equilibria, while an agreement that is 
coalition-proof in E&P's sense need not be. We provide an example with this feature in Section 3. 
The second difference is that in our framework deviations may involve the members of a coalition 
jointly "misreporting" their types, while this possibility is not considered by E&P's notion. In 
section 3 these differences are discussed in detail. Subsequent to our work, Ray [10] has charac-
terized coalition-proof agreements when the players' possibilities of correlating their actions are 
exogenously given. 
As the following example illustrates, correlated play naturally arises when communication is 
possible. Therefore one should take the set of correlated strategies as the set of feasible agreements, 
and one must consider deviations that involve correlated play by members of a deviating coalition. 
Three Player Matching Pennies Game. Three players each simultaneously choose heads 
or tails. If all three faces match, then players 1 and 2 each win a penny while player 
3 loses two pennies. Otherwise, player 3 wins two pennies while players 1 and 2 each 
lose a penny. 
This game has two pure strategy and one mixed strategy Nash equilibria: one pure strategy 
equilibrium consists of players 1 and 2 each choosing heads (tails) and player 3 choosing tails 
(heads). In the mixed strategy equilibrium each player chooses heads with probability!. 
The game does not have a CPNE, as each of the Nash equilibria is upset by a deviation of 
the coalition of players 1 and 2: in the pure strategy Nash equilibrium where players 1 and 2 
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both choose heads, they each obtain a payoff of -1. By jointly deviating (both choosing tails 
instead) players 1 and 2 each obtain a payoff of 1. This deviation is self-enforcing as players 1 and 
2 each obtain their highest possible payoffs and therefore neither player can improve by a further 
unilateral deviation. (A symmetric argument shows that the other pure strategy Nash equilibrium 
is not a CPNE either.) In the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, players 1 and 2 each obtain an 
expected payoff of -!. This equilibrium is not a CPN E as players 1 and 2 can jointly deviate 
(both choosing heads instead) and obtain a payoff of zero. This deviation is self-enforcing, since 
given that player 3 chooses heads or tails with equal probability, neither player can obtain more 
than zero by a further deviation. Since a CPNE must be a Nash equilibrium, this game has no 
CPNE. 
Nevertheless, the game does have an agreement that is resistant to improving deviations. This 
agreement is the correlated strategy where with probability! players 1 and 2 both choose heads 
and with probability! both choose tails, and player 3 chooses heads or tails with equal probability. 
Under this agreement each player has an expected payoff of zero. No single player can deviate and 
improve upon this agreement: neither player 1 nor player 2 can benefit by unilaterally deviating, 
as they both loose a penny whenever their faces do not match. Neither does player 3 benefit from 
deviating: given the probability distribution over the moves of players 1 and 2, he is indifferent 
between heads and tails. Moreover, since the interests of players 1 and 2 are completely opposed 
to those of player 3, no coalition involving player 3 can improve upon the given agreement. Finally, 
given player 3's strategy, players 1 and 2 obtain at most a payoff of zero, and therefore they cannot 
benefit by deviating. Hence, no coalition can gain by deviating from the agreement. 
Notice that the agreement described above is not a mixed strategy and so cannot possibly be 
a CPN E. As we shall see, however, when we expand the space of agreements to include all the 
correlated strategies, this agreement is the unique coalition-proof equilibrium of the game. 
The possibility of players correlating their play arises even when communication is limited. 
Consider, for instance, the following example which is related to a class of games discussed in 
Farrell [5]: two identical firms must simultaneously decide whether to enter a market which is a 
natural monopoly. Firm payoffs are given in the following table: 
Enter Not Enter 
Enter -2,-2 1,-1 
Not Enter -1,1 0,0 
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This game has three Nash equilibria: (Enter, Not Enter), (Not Enter, Enter), and the mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium where each firm enters the market with probability~. Each of these 
Nash equilibria is also a C P NE. 
Although the mixed Nash equilibrium is a CPNE, it is not resistant to improving deviations 
given the possibility of pre-play communication. The firms can improve by augmenting the game 
with a round of cheap talk. In the game with cheap talk each firm simultaneously and publicly an-
nounces whether it intends to "Enter" or "Not Enter" the market. Following both announcements 
each firm makes its choice. 
Suppose the firms agree to play the following Nash (and subgame perfect) equilibrium of the 
game with cheap talk. Each firm announces "Enter" with probability ~. If the profile of announce-
ments is either (Enter, Not Enter) or (Not Enter, Enter), then each firm plays its announcement. 
Otherwise, each firm plays "Enter" with probability ~. This equilibrium yields an expected payoff 
for each firm of -156 while in the mixed Nash equilibrium of the original game each firm has an 
expected payoff of only - ~. 
Pre-play communication has enabled the firms to correlate their play. In this Nash equilibrium 
of the cheap talk game the firms effectively play the correlated strategy of the original game given 
by 
Enter Not Enter 
Enter 5 32 !l 32 
Not Enter 11 32 
5 
32 
This joint probability distribution is not the product of its marginal distributions and therefore 
cannot be obtained from a mixed strategy profile of the game without communication. This 
"correlated deviation" from the mixed strategy equilibrium makes both firms better off. Moreover, 
it is a self-enforcing deviation since it is a correlated equilibrium of the original game. 
Expanding the set offeasible agreements from the mixed strategies (as in CPN E) to the set of 
correlated strategies does not lead simply to an expansion of the set of coalition-proof agreements. 
In the Three Player Matching Pennies game we found a coalition-proof agreement where no C P N E 
existed. In the entry game we found a CPN E that was not coalition-proof. Thus, there is no 
inclusion between the set of CPN E and the set of equilibria that are coalition-proof in our sense. 
In our framework the primitives are a set of feasible agreements and the concepts of feasible 
deviation and of self-enforcing deviation by a coalition from a given agreement. The set of feasible 
deviations by a coalition from a given agreement is the set of all correlated strategies that the 
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coalition can induce when the complementary coalition behaves according to the given agreement 
and when the members of the coalition correlate their play. The definition of a self-enforcing 
deviation is recursive. For a coalition of a single player any feasible deviation is self-enforcing. 
For coalitions of more than one player, a deviation is self-enforcing if it is feasible and if there is 
no further self-enforcing and improving deviation by one of its proper subcoalitions. With these 
concepts, our notion of coalition-proofness is easily formulated: an agreement is coalition-proof if 
no coalition (not even the grand coalition) has a self-enforcing deviation that makes all its members 
better off. 
Our notion of a self-enforcing deviation coincides with that implicit in the concept of CPN E. 
The difference between our notion of coalition-proofness and CPN E is only that we take the set 
of correlated strategies as the space of feasible agreements. For games of complete information, if 
feasible agreements are mixed strategies then our definition of coalition-proofness coincides with 
CPN E. (This is established in Appendix B.) In some situations it may be natural to restrict the 
space of feasible agreements (e.g., if communication is limited) or to limit the possibilities of players 
to form deviations. The framework we propose easily accommodates these kinds of changes. 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 1 we discuss our framework and define our notion 
of equilibrium for games of complete information. In Section 2 we extend the concept of coalition-
proofness to games of incomplete information. Of course, the notion of coalition-proof equilibrium 
for games of incomplete information reduces to that formulated for games of complete information 
when every player has only a single type. We present separately the notion of coalition-proofness for 
games of complete information, as the notion's simplicity in this context facilitates the discussion 
and because we want to stress the fact that our notion of coalition-proofness can be formulated 
without resorting to games of incomplete information. In Section 3 we compare our notion of 
coalition-proof equilibrium and E&P's notion of coalition-proof communication equilibrium, and 
we present some concluding remarks. 
1. Games of Complete Information 
A game in strategic form r is defined as 
where N is the set of players, and for each i E N, Ai is player i's set of actions (or pure strategies) 
and Ui is player i's utility (payoff) function, a real valued function on A = I1ieN Ai. Assume that 
N and A are nonempty and finite. For any finite set Z, denote by 6.Z the set of probability 
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distributions over Z. In particular, denote by b.A the set of probability distributions over A, and 
refer to its members as correlated strategies. Given a correlated strategy J.l, player i's expected 
utility when the players' actions are selected according to J.l is 
Ui(J.l) = L J.l(a)ui(a). 
aEA 
A coalition of players 5 is a member of 2N • When 5 consists of a single player i EN, we write 
it as "i" rather than the more cumbersome {i}. For each 5 E 2N , 5 i= 0, denote by As the set 
DiES Ai. Given a E A, we write a = (as, a_s) where as E As and a_s E A-s . If 5 = N, then 
(as,a_s) = as = a. 
Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium 
We conceive of communication and play as proceeding in two stages. In the first stage players 
communicate, reaching an agreement, and possibly planning deviations from the agreement. Given 
an agreement J.l E b.A, the players implement it with the assistance of a mediator who recommends 
the action profile a E A with probability J.l( a). In the second stage, each player privately receives 
his component of the recommendation and then chooses an action. (No further communication 
occurs in this stage.) 
A deviation by a coalition is a plan for its members to correlate their play in a way different 
from that prescribed by the agreement. We take a broad view of the ability of coalitions to plan 
deviations: for every different profile of recommendations received by its members, a deviating 
coalition may plan a different correlated strategy. Therefore, a deviation for a coalition 5 is a 
mapping from the set As of profiles of recommendations for its members, to the set b.As of 
probability distributions on the set of the coalition's action profiles. 
Given an agreement Ji, if a coalition 5 plans to deviate according to "ls : As --+ b.As (while 
the members of the complement of 5 play their part of the agreement; i.e. they obey their 
recommendations), then the induced probability distribution over action profiles for the grand 
coalition is given for each a E A by 
J.l(a) = L ji(as,a_s)"ls(aslas). 
asEAs 
It will be convenient to define the feasible deviations for coalition 5 as those correlated strategies 
J.l E A which the coalition can induce, rather than as mappings from As to b.As. Thus, a correlated 
strategy is a feasible deviation by coalition 5 from a given agreement if the members of 5, using 
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some plan to correlate their play, can induce the correlated strategy when each member of the 
complementary coalition obeys his recommendation. 
Definition 1.1. Let ji E 6A and S E 2N , S =/: 0. We say that J1, E 6A is a feasible deviation 
by coalition S from ji if there is a 1]s : As --t 6As, such that for all a E A, we have J1,(a) = 
2: ji(os, a_s)1]s(aslos) . 
Cl'sEAs 
We illustrate our definition of a feasible deviation by describing a procedure that can be thought 
of as mimicking the process by which players select agreements and plan deviations. Given an 
agreement ji, suppose that the mediator implementing ji mails a sealed envelop to each player 
containing the player's recommendation. A coalition S deviates from ji by employing a new 
mediator to which each member of S sends the (unopened) envelop it received from the mediator 
implementing ji. The new mediator opens the envelops, reads the recommendations as, and then 
selects a new profile of recommendations according to the correlated strategy 1]s (as). The mediator 
then mails to each player i E S a sealed envelop containing his recommended action. When each 
player opens his envelop and obeys the recommendation it contains, the induced correlated strategy 
is given by the equation in Definition 1.1. 
Given a coalition S E 2N , S =/: 0, and an agreement J1,E 6A, let D(J1" S) denote the set of 
feasible deviations by coalition S from J1,; note that J1,ED(J1" S), since a coalition always has the 
trivial "deviation" consisting of each member of the coalition obeying his own recommendation. 
Also note that for every J1, E 6A, we have D(J1" N) = 6A. A correlated equilibrium is a correlated 
strategy from which no individual has a feasible improving deviation. 
Correlated Equilibrium. A correlated strategy J1, is a correlated equilibrium if no individual 
i E N, has a feasible deviation {lE D(J1" i), such that Ui (p,) > Ui(J1,). 
The definition of strong Nash equilibrium suggests the following definition of strong correlated 
equilibrium1: a strong correlated equilibrium is a correlated strategy from which no coalition has 
a devia.tion which makes every member of the coalition better off. 
1A notion of strong correlated equilibrium was informally proposed in Moulin [8]. 
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Definition 1.2. A correlated strategy j.t E ~A is a strong correlated equilibrium if no coalition 
S E 2N , S =I 0, has a feasible deviation jj E D(j.t, S), such that for each i E S, we have Ui(jj) > 
Ui(j.t ). 
The agreement described in the introduction for the Three Player Matching Pennies game is, 
for example, the unique strong correlated equilibrium of that game. Like strong Nash equilibrium, 
the notion of strong correlated equilibrium is too strong. A strong correlated equilibrium must be 
resistant to any feasible deviation by any coalition. In particular, it must be resistant to deviations 
which are not themselves resistant to further deviations. Consider, for example, the Prisoner's 
Dilemma game. 
C D 
C 1,1 -1,2 
D 2,-1 0,0 
This game has a unique correlated equilibrium where (D, D) is played with probability one. This 
correlated equilibrium is not a strong correlated equilibrium since the correlated strategy jj consist-
ing of playing (C, C) with probability one is a feasible deviation which makes both players better 
off. Since a strong correlated equilibrium must be a correlated equilibrium, this game has no strong 
correlated equilibrium. Notice, however, that either player can unilaterally deviate from jj and 
increase his payoff. Hence jj should not undermine an agreement to play (D, D) with probability 
one. 
In order to be able to distinguish those deviations that are viable from those that are not (and 
which therefore should not upset an agreement as coalition-proof), we introduce the notion of 
self-enforcing deviation: a correlated strategy j.t is a self-enforcing deviation by coalition S from 
correlated strategy p if j.t is a feasible deviation and if no proper subcoalition of S has a further 
self-enforcing and improving deviation. This notion of self-enforcingness is identical to the one 
implicit in the concept of CPN E. 
Definition 1.3. Let PE ~A and S E 2N , S =I 0. The set of self-enforcing deviations by coalition 
S from p, SED(p, S), is defined, recursively, as follows. 
(i) If I S 1= 1, then SED(P, S) = D(P, S); 
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(ii) If 1S I> 1, then SED(p, S) = {p E D(p, S) If-l [R E 25 \S, R =J 0, {lE SED(p, R)] such 
that Vi ER: Ui(fJ,) > Ui(p)}, 
Since a coalition consisting of a single player has no proper (nonempty) subcoalitions, any 
feasible deviation by a one-player coalition is self-enforcing. With this notion of a self-enforcing 
deviation, a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium is defined to be a correlated strategy from which 
no coalition has a self-enforcing and improving deviation. 
Definition 1.4. A correlated strategy p is a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium if no coalition 
SE 2N , S =J 0, has a deviation {l E SED(p,S), such that for each i E S, we have Ui(fJ,) > Ui(p). 
It is clear that a strong correlated equilibrium is a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium, which 
in turn is a correlated equilibrium. For two-player games the set of coalition-proof correlated 
equilibria is the set of correlated equilibria which are not Pareto dominated by other correlated 
equilibria. Thus, for two-player games, the set of coalition-proof correlated equilibria is nonempty. 
Although existence of a CPCE cannot be guaranteed in general games, we have identified condi-
tions under which a CPCE exists. 
On the Existence of Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium 
We show that a CPCE exists whenever there is a correlated strategy whose support is the set of 
action profiles that survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies and which Pareto 
dominates every other correlated strategy with support in this set. First, we define formally the 
notion of strict dominance. 
Definition 1.5. Let B = TIiEN B i C A arbitrary. An action aj E B j is said to be strictly 
dominated in B if there is Uj E .6.Bj such that for each a_j E B_ j 
L uj(aj)uj(aj,a_j) > ui(aj,a_j). 
ajEBj 
Note that if aj is strictly dominated in B, then it is also strictly dominated in A j x B_ j . The 
set of action profiles that survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, which we 
write as A00, is now easily defined. 
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Definition 1.6. The set Aooof action profiles that survive the iterated elimination of strictly 
dominated strategies, is defined by Aoo = TIiEN Ar, where each Ar = n~=o Af, Af is the set of 
actions that are not strictly dominated in An-l = TIiEN Ai-I, and A? = Ai. 
The following proposition establishes that only correlated strategies whose support is Aoo can 
be self-enforcing deviations from a correlated strategy whose support is Aoo. For each {l E .6.A and 
S E 2N , S ::j:. 0, write At ({l) for the set {as E As I {l( as, a_s) > 0 some a_s E A_s}, and write 
A+({l) for the set At({l). 
Proposition. Let S E 2N , S ::j:. 0, and let {lE .6.A be such that A+ ({l) C AOO. If ji E SED({l, S), 
then A+(ji) CAoo. 
Proof: Let S and {lE .6.A be as in the Proposition, and let ji E SED({l, S). By the definition of 
feasible deviation (Definition 1.1) A+(ji) C As x A~s. We show that in fact A+(ji) C Aoo. Suppose 
by way of contradiction that At(ji) rt As:'. Let n* be the largest n such that At(ji)c As. Hence 
there is j E Sand aj E At (ji) such that aj is strictly dominated in An·. Thus aj is also strictly 
dominated in Aj x A~j; i.e., there is (Jj E .6.Aj such that for each a_j E A~j 
L: (Jj(aj)uj(aj,a_j) > ui(aj,a_j). (*) 
a}e A} 
Consider the deviation {l' by player j from ji where player j chooses an action according to 
(Jj when recommended aj, and takes the recommended action otherwise. Formally, the deviation 
7]j is defined as follows: for each aj E Aj such that aj ::j:. aj, let 7]j(aj I aj) = 1 if aj = aj, and 
7]j(aj I aj) = 0 if aj ::j:. aj; for aj = aj, let 7];(aj Iaj) = (Jj(aj). Again by the definition of feasible 
deviation A+({l') C Aj x A~j. Then 
substituting 7]j as defined above we have 
Since ji(aj, a_j) > 0 for some a_j E A~j, equation (*) implies 
Uj({l') > L ji(a)uj(a) + L: ji( aj,a_j)uj(aj,a_j); 
aE(A}\{a}})xA~; aE{a}}xA~j 
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I.e., 
Uj(J1') > L j7(a)uj(a) = Uj (j7). 
aEA 
Hence jJ, is not a self-enforcing deviation by S from J1; i.e., jJ, rJ SED(J1, S). This contradiction 
establishes that A+(fJ,) cAoo. 0 
Suppose that J1 is a correlated strategy with support in Aoo and that J1 weakly Pareto dominates 
any other correlated strategy with support in Aoo (i.e., for each jJ, such that A+(fJ,) c Aoo we have 
Ui(J1) ~ Ui(fJ,), for each i EN). Then the support of any feasible and improving deviation by a 
coalition S from J1 cannot be contained in Aoo, and by the above proposition such a deviation is 
not self-enforcing. Therefore, we obtain the following corollary. 
Corollary. Let J1 E L.A be such that A+(J1) cAoo and such that it weakly Pareto dominates every 
other jJ, E L.A for which A+(jJ,) cAoo. Then J1 is a CPCE. 
Dominance solvable games are those for which the set Aoo is a singleton. Our corollary implies 
that a dominance solvable game has an attractive property: its unique equilibrium is coalition-
proof (i.e. it is a C PCE). 
In Appendix B we show that the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria ..of a game can be 
characterized as the set of mixed strategies from which no coalition has a self-enforcing deviation 
which makes all its members better off. The proposition above is easily modified to show that if 
a mixed strategy profile a has a support in Aoo then any self-enforcing mixed deviation from a 
also has a support in Aoo. Thus, a CPNE exists in dominance solvable games. In fact, a CPNE 
exists whenever there is a mixed strategy profile in Aoo which weakly Pareto dominates every other 
mixed strategy profile in A00. 2 
A Game Where a CPCE does not exist 
Unfortunately, as the following example shows, there are games with more than two players with 
no coalition-proof correlated equilibria. Consider the following three-player game, taken from Einy 
and Peleg, where player 1 chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column, and player 3 chooses the 
matrix. 
2Paul Milgrom has reported that for games with strategic complementarities if either (1) the equilibrium is 
unique or (2) the Pareto ranking theorem applies, then the Pareto-best Nash equilibrium is also coalition-proof. 
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3,2,0 0,0,0 3,2,0 0,3,2 
2,0,3 2,0,3 0,0,0 0,3,2 
We show that there does not exist a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium of this game. Let fi, be 
an arbitrary correlated equilibrium and suppose that player 1 has the lowest payoff of the three 
players. Then U3 (fi,) ::s; ~3. (This can be proven by maximizing player 3's utility over the set of 
correlated equilibria J-L satisfying U1 (J-L) ::s; max{U2(J-L),U3 (J-L)}.) Moreover, U1 (fi,) ::s; I; since player 
1 has the lowest payoff. Now consider the following deviation from fi, by players 1 and 3: player 1 
chooses the bottom row and player 3 chooses the left matrix. This deviation is improving as players 
1 and 3 now receive payoffs of 2 and 3, respectively. To demonstrate that fi, is not a coalition-proof 
correlated equilibrium we need only show that this deviation is self-enforcing. Clearly player 3 
does not deviate further as he now obtains 3, his highest possible payoff. It can be shown that 
player 1 obtains at most ~ by deviating further and choosing the top row.3 (The details of this 
calculation are in the appendix.) Thus, fi, is not a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium as players 
1 and 3 have a self-enforcing and improving deviation. 
There was no loss of generality in assuming that player 1 has the lowest payoff. If player 2 
has the lowest payoff, then there is a self-enforcing and improving deviation by players 2 and 1. If 
player 3 has the lowest payoff, then there is a self-enforcing and improving deviation by players 3 
and 2. Since any correlated equilibrium has a self-enforcing deviation by two players which makes 
both players better off, this game has no coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. (This game also 
does not have a C P NE. ) 
2. Games of Incomplete Information 
In this section we extend our notion of coalition proofness to games of incomplete information. A 
(finite) game of incomplete information (or Bayesian game) G is defined by 
where N is the set of players, and for each i EN, Ti is the set of possible types for player i, Ai 
is player i's action set, Pi : Ti -t 6T_i is player i's prior probability distribution over the set of 
3Following the deviation by players 1 and 3, player 1 is choosing the bottom row with probability one. Hence, 
when considering a further deviation by player 1 there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to the deviation 
where he chooses the top row with probability one. If this deviation does not make him better off, then no deviation 
does. 
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type profiles for the other players in the game (T_ i = I1jEN\{i} Tj ), and Ui : T x A --+ R is player 
i's utility (payoff) function (A = I1iEN Ai, T = I1iEN T;). We assume that the sets N, A, and T 
are nonempty and finite. For every coalition of players S E 2N , S #- 0, we denote by Ts the set 
I1iES Ti . 
A correlated strategy is a function j1 : T --+ ~A. We let C denote the set of all correlated 
strategies. Given j1 E C, if each player reports his type truthfully and obeys his recommendation, 
then player i's expected payoff when he is of type t; E T; is 
Ui(j1ltd = L: L: pi(Lil t;)j1(alt)ui(a, t). 
t_iET_i aEA 
Notice that in order for the players to play according to a correlated strategy, information 
about the players' types must be revealed so that an action profile can be selected according to 
the probability distribution specified by the given correlated strategy. We therefore must allow 
deviations by a coalition in which the players reveal a type profile different from their true one, 
as well as deviations where the players take actions different from those recommended. In the 
conceptual framework of mediation, the members of a coalition can deviate from a correlated 
strategy Ji by misreporting their type profile to the mediator or by disobeying the mediator's 
recommendations. 
Intuitively, a deviation can be conceived of as follows: A coalition S carries out a deviation 
by employing a new mediator who represents the coalition with the mediator implementing 11 and 
with whom the members of S communicate. Each member of S reports his type to this mediator 
who then (1) selects according to some fs : Ts --+ ~Ts a type profile for the coalition (which he 
reports to the mediator implementing j1) and, upon receiving from the mediator implementing j1 the 
recommendations for the members of S, (2) selects according to some T/s : Ts x Ts x As --+ ~As an 
action profile (which he recommends to the coalition members). The action profile recommended 
by the new mediator depends upon the type profile reported to it, the type profile it reported 
to the mediator implementing j1, and the actions recommended by the mediator implementing 
11. This deviation generates a new correlated strategy which can be calculated from fs and T/s 
according to the formula given in Definition 2.1. 
Definition 2.1. Let Ji E C and S E 2N, S #- 0. A correlated strategy j1 is a feasible deviation by 
coalition S from Ji if there are fs : Ts --+ ~Ts, and T/s : Ts x Ts x As --+ ~As; such that for each 
,-------
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t E T and each a E A 
j.t(alt) = L L fS(7"slts)j1(as,a-sl7"s,Ls)1}s(asl7"s,ts,as). 
TsETs QsEAs 
The set of feasible deviations by coalition S from a correlated strategy is the set of correlated 
strategies that the coalition can induce by means of some fs and 1}S. Given j.tE C and S E 2N , 
S =F 0, denote by D(j.t, S) the set of all feasible deviations by coalition S from correlated strategy 
j.t. As in Section 1, for every j.t E C and S E 2N , we have j.t E D(j.t, S) and D(j.t, N) = C. 
For expositional ease, we explicitly introduce a concept of Pareto dominance: a correlated 
strategy jj, Pareto dominates another correlated strategy j.t for coalition S if no member of S is 
worse off under jj, than under j.t for any type profile, and if for at least one type profile every 
member of S is better off under jJ than under j.t. 
Definition 2.2. Let S E 2N , S =F 0, and let j.t,jj, E C. We say that jj, Pareto dominates j.t for 
coalition S (or that jj, Pareto S -dominates j.t) if 
(2.1.1) For each ts E Ts , and each i E S : Ui(jj,/ti) :::: Ui(j.tlti), and 
(2.1.2) There is is E Ts such that for each i E S: Ui(jj,lii) > Ui(j.tliJ 
In our framework, the notion of Pareto dominance used determines whether a deviation is an 
improvement for a coalition. Consequently, alternative notions of Pareto dominance will lead to 
different notions of coalition-proof communication equilibrium. There are two alternative notions 
worth considering. 
We say that jj, weakly Pareto S-dominates j.t if no member of S is worse off under jj, than under 
j.t for any type profile (i.e., if (2.1.1) is satisfied), and if at least one member of S is better off 
under jj, than under j.t for some type profile (i.e., if (2.1.2) is satisfied for some i E S rather than 
for all i E S). The notion of weak Pareto dominance does not seem appropriate: an agreement 
will be ruled out if a coalition has a self-enforcing deviation which makes only a proper subset of 
its members better off, even though there are not clear incentives for such a coalition to form. 
We say that jj, strongly Pareto S-dominates j.t if the members of S are better off under jj, 
than under j.t for all possible type profiles (i.e., if the inequalities (2.1.1) are satisfied with strict 
inequality). Strong Pareto dominance is sometimes too strong. For example, if the utility function 
of some player is constant for one of his types, then there is no deviation which is improving for 
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this player. Using strong Pareto dominance rules out the possibility of this player participating in 
any deviation. 
It is easy to see that a correlated strategy J-l is a communication equilibrium if no single player 
i E N has a feasible deviation which Pareto i-dominates J-l. In the spirit of the notion of strong Nash 
equilibrium, a strong communication equilibrium can be defined as follows: correlated strategy J-l 
is a strong communication equilibrium if no coalition S has a feasible deviation which Pareto S-
dominates J-l. We only want to require, however, that an agreement not be Pareto dominated by 
self-enforcing deviations. The notion of self-enforcingness we define is identical to that introduced 
in Section 1. 
Definition 2.3. Let p E C and S E 2N , S =f:. 0. The set of self-enforcing deviations by coalition 
S from p, SED(p, S), is defined, recursively, as follows. 
(i) If 1S 1= 1, then SED(P, S) = D(p, S); 
(ii) If 1S I> 1, then SED(P, S) = {J-l E D(p, S)I f-1[R E 28 \S, R =f:. 0, j1 E SED(J-l, R)] such 
that j1 Pareto R-dominates J-l}. 
\Vith this notion of self-enforcingness, a coalition-proof communication equilibrium is defined 
to be any correlated strategy J-l from which no coalition S has a self-enforcing deviation which 
Pareto S-dominates J-l. 
Definition 2.4. A correlated strategy If is a coalition-proof communication equilibrium (CPCE) 
if no coalition S E 2N , S =f:. 0, has a self-enforcing deviation j1 E SED(J-l, S) such that j1 Pareto 
S-dominates J-l. 
When the set of type profiles T is a singleton, the concepts of strong and coalition-proof com-
munication equilibrium reduce to, respectively, strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. 
Note that a strong communication equilibrium is a coalition-proof communication equilibrium, 
which in turn is a communication equilibrium. 
In two-player Bayesian games, the set of coalition-proof communication equilibria consists 
of the communication equilibria that are not Pareto N-dominated by any other communication 
equilibrium (i.e., the set of interim efficient communication equilibria). 4 Hence, for two-player 
"'See Holmstrom and Myerson. 
r-------
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Bayesian games a CPCE always exists. As established by example in Section 1, games with more 
than two players need not have a CPCE. 
3. Discussion 
In this section we discuss the relation of CPCE to Einy and Peleg's notion of coalition-proof 
communication equilibrium (which we denote by CPCEEP ), and we present some concluding 
remarks. 
In CPCE deviations are evaluated prior to the players receiving recommendations: a deviation 
is improving if it makes each member of the deviating coalition better off, conditional on his type, 
for at least one of his types and no worse off for any of his types. In contrast, in C PCEEP 
deviations are considered after players receive recommendations: a deviation is improving if it 
makes each member of the deviating coalition better off, conditional on both his type and his 
recommendation, for each combination of types and recommendations that occur with positive 
probability. 
Consequently, for two person games, while a CPCE must be interim efficient a CPC EEP need 
not be. This is illustrated by the game Chicken given below by the left matrix. The right matrix 
describes the correlated equilibrium p, which yields an expected payoff of 5 for each player. 
L R L R 
T 6,6 2,7 p,: T 1/3 1/3 
B 7,2 0,0 B 1/3 o 
This correlated strategy is not a CPCE as the grand coalition has the self-enforcing devia.tion ji 
given by 
L R 
T 1/2 1/4 
B 1/4 0 
which yields an expected payoff of 5.25 for each player. (The deviation ji is self-enforcing since it 
is a correlated equilibrium and therefore is immune to further deviations by a single player.) 
Nonetheless, p, is a C PCEEP. In this game each player has only a single type; therefore, 
for a deviation to be improving in Einy and Peleg's sense, it must make each player better off, 
conditional on his recommendation, for each of his possible recommendations. Consider player 1 
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given the recommendation B. His expected payoff conditional on his recommendation is 7. Since 
7 is player l's highest possible payoff, no coalition involving player 1 can improve upon il. 5 
One interpretation of E&P's framework is that players have the opportunity to communicate 
only after each player has received his recommendation. Thus, when determining whether or not 
an agreement is a C PCEEP, the agreement is elevated to the position of a status quo agreement. 
It is required to be resistant to deviations following recommendations, but it is not confronted 
with alternative agreements which are improving at the stage prior to each player receiving his 
recommendation. If players have the opportunity to discuss their play prior to receiving recom-
mendations, however, they will exhaust the opportunities for improvements at this stage. For the 
game Chicken, if the players must decide whether to play il or ji, they should choose ji as, given 
that both are resistant to further deviations, ji gives a higher expected payoff to each player. 
The second fundamental way in which the notions of coalition proofness differ is that Einy and 
Peleg do not admit the possibility that members of a coalition jointly "misreport" their types. 
A CPCEEP must be a communication equilibrium, and so a CPCEEP is immune to deviations 
where a single player misreports his type and disobeys his recommendation. However, in Einy 
and Peleg's framework, at the stage where deviations are considered, the players are assumed to 
have already truthfully reported their types. Thus, deviations may not involve the members of 
a coalition jointly misreporting their types, or involve one member of a coalition misreporting 
his type and another member of the coalition disobeying his recommendation.' An example of a 
C PCEEP which fails to be immune to this latter kind of deviation is illustrated in the game of 
incomplete information below. The game is the same as the Three Player Matching Pennies game 
described in the Introduction, except that player l's moves have now become his types. 
1,1,-2 -1,-1,2 t I = TI : H2 -1,-1,2 -1,-1,2 
I-----+-------i 
-1,-1,2 -1,-1,2 T2 -1,-1,2 1,1,-2 
Player 1 now has two possible types {HI, Td and no actions, while players 2 and 3 both have a 
singleton type set and their action sets remain, respectively, {H2 , T2 } and {H3 , T3 }. Assume that 
the priors of players 2 and 3 over player l's types are, respectively, P2 (HI) = P3 (HI) = 1· 
5It can be shown that there is no improving deviation upon J.t in E&P's sense even with the weaker requirement 
that a deviation makes each member of the deviating coalition better off for at least one recommendation and at 
least as well off for all recommendations. 
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The correlated strategy J1 given by J1(H2 , TalHd = 1 and J1(T2 , HaiTI) = 1, is a communication 
equilibrium of the game which yields expected payoffs of UI (J1IHd = UI(J1ITd = -1, U2 (J1) = -1, 
and Ua(J1) = 2. It is also a CPCEEP: in E&P's framework, a deviation by a coalition is a 
mapping from the set of type and action (recommendation) profiles for the coalition to probability 
distributions over the coalition's set of action profiles. The coalition {1,2} has no improving 
deviation since, if player 1 is of type HI, then player 3 moves Ta with probability one and players 
1 and 2 have a payoff of -1 regardless of the action taken by player 2. By the same argument, the 
coalition cannot improve if player 1 is of type TI • No coalition involving player 3 has an improving 
deviation as the interests of players 1 and 2 are completely opposed to the interests of player 3. 
That no single player has an improving deviation follows from the fact that J1 is a communication 
equilibrium. 
In contrast, J1 is not a CPCE of the game. Consider the deviation by the coalition {I, 2} where 
player 1 reports TI when his type is HI and he reports HI when his type is TI, and where player 2 
moves H 2 when recommended T2 and moves T2 when recommended H2 • This deviation results in 
the correlated strategy j1 given by j1(H2 , HalHd = j1(T2 , TaITI) = 1, which yields expected payoffs 
of UI(J1IHd = UI (J1ITd = 1 and U2(J1) = 1. The deviation makes both players better off and 
is also self-enforcing (as both players attain their maximum possible payoff). Hence J1 is not a 
CPCE. 
Note that even if players can communicate only following th~ receipt ofrecommendations, 
CPC EEP assumes a certain myopia on the part of player 1. Consider again the CPCEEP of the 
Three Player Matching Pennies game where J1(H2 , TaIHI) = 1 and J1(T2 , HalTd = 1. If player 1 is 
of type HI a.nd if he anticipates the opportunity to communicate following player 2's receipt of his 
recommendation, then player 1 should report type TI and, at the communication stage, suggest 
to player 2 that he should move H 2• Player 2 should follow player 1's suggestion given that his 
interests are coincident with player 1'so 
This game has a unique CPCE (which is also a CPCEEP ) where player 3 moves Ha with 
probability ~ regardless of player 1's type, and player 2 moves H2 when player 1's type is HI and 
moves T2 when player 1's type is TI • This is essentially the same agreement predicted for the 
complete information version of the game. In fact, given that the interests of players 1 and 2 are 
coincident and opposed to those of player 3, this seems the only reasonable outcome. 
We conclude by emphasizing our findings. First, we show that when players can communicate 
they will reach correlated agreements. For example, in the Three Player Matching Pennies Game 
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the only intuitive agreement is a correlated (and not mixed) agreement. Second, we offer a natural 
definition of coalition-proof equilibrium when correlated agreements are possible, and we show that 
no inclusion relationship between this new notion and C PNE is to be found. (Consequently, the 
notion of coalition proofness is sensitive to the possibility of correlated agreements.) And third, 
we obtain conditions under which a coalition-proof equilibrium exists. 
Appendix A 
In this appendix we present two examples. The first example is a game that has no coalition-proof 
correlated equilibrium. The second example is the Three Player Matching Pennies game; we show 
that the correlated strategy described in the introduction is the unique coalition-proof correlated 
equilibrium (and the unique strong correlated equilibrium) of the game. 
A game with no coalition proof correlated equilibrium 
We show that the game below has no coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. 
a1 3,2,0 0,0,0 a1 3,2,0 0,3,2 
a2 2,0,3 2,0,3 a2 0,0,0 0,3,2 
~ 
\-Ve represent a correlated strategy for this game as P = (Pijk)i,j,kE{1.2}l where Pijk ~ °denotes the 
probability that players 1,2 and 3 are recommended, respectively, actions ai, bj, and Ck· 
If P is a correlated equilibrium, then it satisfies the system of inequalities (1) given by 
(I.a1) Pll1 2P121 + 3P1l2 ~o 
(I.a2) P211 + 2P221 3P212 ~o 
(I.bd 2Pll1 P112 3P212 ~o 
(J.b2) 2P121 + P122 + 3P222 ~O 
(I,C1) 2P121 + 3P211 + P221 ~o 
(I.C2) 2P122 3P212 P222 ~O 
We show that for each correlated equilibrium there is a coalition of two players which has an 
improving and self-enforcing deviation. Therefore, since a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium 
must be a correlated equilibrium, the set of CPCE of this game is empty. 
r-· 
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Let Jl be an arbitrary correlated equilibrium and suppose that player 1 has the lowest payoff of 
the three players. We show that the coalition of players 1 and 3 has a self-enforcing and improving 
deviation. If player 1 has the lowest payoff in a correlated equilibrium, then player 3's payoff is no 
larger than 153, which is the value of the solution to the linear programing problem 
We also have VI (Jl) ~ ~ since player 1 has the lowest payoff. 
Consider the deviation ji induced by players 1 and 3 playing (a2' Cl) with probability one for each 
profile of recommendations. (Then ji211 = J-llll +J-l211 +J-l112 +J-l212, ji221 = J-l12I +J-l22I +J-l122 +J-l222 , 
and jiijk = 0 otherwise.) Given this deviation, then regardless of player 2's action, players 1 and 
3 obtain payoffs of, respectively, 2 and 3. Hence VI (ji) = 2 > VI (Jl) and V3 (ji) = 3 > V3 (Jl) and 
so ji is an improving deviation for {I, 3}. 
\Ve now show that ji is self-enforcing. Clearly player 3 does not have a further improving 
deviation as he obtains his highest possible payoff. Player 1 has an improving deviation if the 
expected payoff of deviating to aI, which is 3ji211' is greater than VI (ji) = 2 (his expected payoff 
when he follows a recommendation to play a2)' However, this payoff is not larger than ~, which is 
the value of the solution to the linear programing problem 
The value of this maximization problem is the maximum payoff that player 1 can obtain by a 
further deviation to aI from the correlated strategy ji given then the original agreement J-l was 
a correlated equilibrium in which player 1 had the lowest payoff. Hence player 1 has no further 
improving deviation. 
There was no loss of generality in assuming that player 1 has the lowest payoff. Given the 
symmetry of this game, we can construct the following self-enforcing and improving deviations in 
each case: If player 2 has the lowest payoff, then players 1 and 2 deviate to {aI' bd. If player 
3 has the lowest payoff, then players 2 and 3 deviate to {b2 , C2}' Therefore, this game has no 
coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. 
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Three Player Matching Pennies 
The payoff matrix for the Three Player Matching Pennies game is given by 
H 3 T 3 
H 2 T 2 H 2 T 2 
HI 1,1,-2 -1,-1,2 HI -1,-1,2 -1,-1,2 
T I -1,-1,2 -1,-1,2 T I -1,-1,2 1,1,-2 
In the Introduction we demonstrated that the correlated strategy J,l'" given in the table below is a 
strong correlated equilibrium. 
H3 T3 
H2 T2 H2 T2 
HI HI[I]JJ [I]JJ 
TI TILITIJ LITIJ 
We now establish that J,l* is the unique coalition-proof correlated equilibrium of this game. (A 
strong correlated equilibrium is also a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium, therefore J,l* is also 
the unique strong correlated equilibrium). Let J,l be any correlated strategy. We reduce notation by 
writing for J,lxyz for the probability J,l(XI, Y2, Z3), where (XI, Y2, Z3) E {HI, Td x {H2 , T 2 } X {H3, T 3}; 
e.g., we write J,lTTH for J,l(TI, T 2, H 3 ). If J,l is a correlated equilibrium, then it must satisfy the system 
of inequalities (1) given by 
2J,lHHH 2J,lHTT ~ 0 
2J,lTHH + 2J,lTTT ~ 0 
2J,lHHH 
2J,lHTH + 2J,lTTT ~ 0 
4J,lHHH + 4J,lTTH ~ 0 
4J,lHHT 4J,lTTT ~ 0 
Note that (1.H3 ) implies J,lTTH ~ J,lHHH, and (1.T3) implies J,lHHT ~ J,lTTT. Hence player 3's payoff, 
U3(J,l) = 2( -J,lHHH + J,lHTH + J,lTHH + J,lTTH + J,lHHT + J,lHTT + J,lTHT - J,lTTT), 
satisfies U 3(J,l) ~ O. Since for each (XI, Y2, Z3) E {HI, Td x {H2, T 2} X {H3, T 3}, UI(XI, Y2, Z3) + 
U2(Xll Y2, Z3) +U3(XI, Y2, Z3) = 0, we have UI(J,l) = U 2(J,l) ~ O. 
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We now establish the following result. 
CLAIM: If J1 is a CPCE, then UI (J1) = U2(J1) = 0, and J1HHH + J1HTH + J1THH + J1TTH = !. 
PROOF: Let J1 be a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. We have shown that in any correlated 
equilibrium UI (J1) = U2 (J1) ~ O. Suppose by way of contradiction that UI (J1) = U2 (J1) < O. 
Consider the deviation where players 1 and 2 play (HI, H2 ) with probability! and (TI, T2) with 
probability!, regardless of their recommendations. This deviation induces the correlated strategy 
ji given by 
H2 T2 H2 T2 
HI [ilOl 1 1;' I IHI 0 
TI ~ TI 0 I;A 
where A = J1HHH + J1HTH + J1THH + J1TTH· This deviation is improving since UI (ji) = U2(Ji) = o. 
It it also self-enforcing since a further deviation by either player 1 or 2 makes the player strictly 
worse off. The existence of such a deviation contradicts that J1 is a CPCE. Thus, we must have 
(2) J1HHH - J1HTH - J1THH - J1TTH - J1HHT - J1HTT - J1THT + J1TTT = O. 
Vve now show that A == !. Suppose that A > !. Then the deviation by players 1 and 2 where, 
regardless of their recommendation, they move (HI, H2 ) with probability one is i_IJ1proving (players 
1 and 2 each have an expected payoff of A+ (1 - A) > 0) and self-enforcing, contradicting that J1 
is a CPCE. The case A < ! is symmetric. Therefore A = !; i.e., 
1 (3) J1HHH + J1HTH + J1THH + J1TTH == 2. 0 
Finally, we show that if J1 is a CPCE, then J1HHH == J1HHT = J1TTT == J1TTH = ~. As J1 is a 
correlated strategy, we have 
(4) J1HHH + J1HTH + J1THH + J1TTH + J1HHT + J1HTT + J1THT + J1TTT = 1. 
Adding (2) and (4) we get 
1 
(*) J1HHH + J1TTT = 2' 
Also (l.H3 ) and (l.T3 ) yield J1TTH ~ J1HHH, and J1HHT ~ J1TTT. Adding these two inequalities and 
noticing (4) we get 
1 
J1TTH + J1HHT = 2' 
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Thus, (4) implies ItHTH = ItTHH = ItHTT = ItTHT = O. Substituting in (3) we get 
(* * *) ItHHH + ItTTH = 2'1 
Subtracting (* * *) from (*) we get ItTTT -ItTTH = Oj i.e., ItTTT = ItTTH. Substituting in (**) 
and subtracting (*), we have ItHHT - ItHHH = Oj Le., ItHHT = ItHHH. Using (1.H3) and (1.T3) 
again implies 
ItHHH = ItHHT ~ ItTTT = ItTTH ~ ItHHH· 
Hence ItHHH = ItHHT = ItTTT = ItTTH = ~.D 
Appendix B 
In this appendix we prove Proposition B.l which characterizes the set of coalition-proof Nash 
equilibria as the set of mixed strategies from which no coalition has a self-enforcing deviation 
which makes all its members better off. 
For S E 2N, S # 0, let ~s denote the set of probability distributions Us over As = DiES Ai 
satisfying us(as) = DiES ui(ai) for all as E As, where ui(ai) = LaS\{i}EAS\{i} us(aS\{i}, ai) is the 
marginal distribution of Us over Ai. Write ~ for the set ~N, and refer to its members as mixed 
strategies. If 1N I> 1, then ~ is a proper subset of t:.A. Given u E ~ and S E 2N, we denote by 
Us the marginal distribution of u over As (i.e., Vas E As : us(as) = La_sEA_s.O'(as, Q-s) ). Here 
a mixed strategy is a probability distribution over A. A mixed strategy u E ~ has an equivalent 
and more conventional representation as a strategy profile, (UI, ... , un). 
Given an agreement 0- E ~, define the set of feasible mixed deviations by coalition S from 0- as 
those mixed strategies that are obtained when each player i, i E S, randomizes independently ac-
cording to some o-i, while each player j, j E N\S, follows the agreement and randomizes according 
to o-j. In other words, u is a feasible deviation from 0- by coalition S if u can be written as a mixed 
strategy profile ((o-i)iES, (o-j)jEN\S) where (o-i)iES is some mixed strategy profile for members of S. 
This is established formally in Definition B.1. 
Definition B.t. Let o-E ~ and S E 2N, S # 0. We say that u E ~ is a feasible mixed deviation by 
coalition S from 0- if there is a o-s E ~s, such that for all a E A, we have u(a) = o-s(as)o-_s(a_s). 
Let DM ( 0-, S) denote the set of feasible mixed deviations by coalition S from 0-. It is clear that 
a mixed strategy is a Nash equilibrium if no single player has a feasible mixed deviation which 
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makes him better off. A mixed strategy is a strong Nash equilibrium if no coalition has a feasible 
and improving mixed deviation. 
The definition of a self-enforcing mixed deviation is obtained by replacing in Definition 1.3 the 
set of deviations with the set of mixed deviations. Hence, a mixed strategy a is a self-enforcing 
mixed deviation by coalition S from a if a is a feasible mixed deviation and if no proper subcoalition 
of S has a further self-enforcing and improving mixed deviation from a. 
Definition B.2. Let aE E and S E 2N , S =j:. 0. The set of self-enforcing mixed deviations by 
coalition S from a, SEDM(a, S), is defined, recursively, as follows 
(i) If IS 1= 1, then SEDM(a, S) = DM(a, S); 
(ii) If I S I> 1, then SEDM(a,S) = {a E DM(a,S) If-l [R E 2S\S, R =j:. 0, uE SEDM(a,R)] 
such that Vi ER: Ui(u) > Ui(a)}. 
Using the notions of feasible and of self-enforcing deviation by a coalition from a mixed strategy, 
we define the notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium as follows. 
Definition B.3. Let r = (N, (Ai)iEN, (Ui)iEN) be a game in strategic form. A strategy profile a E 
E is a CPN E' if no coalition S E 2N, S =j:. 0, has a self-enforcing mixed deviation u E SEDM(a, S) 
such that for each i E S, we have Ui(a) > Ui(a). 
Definition BA below formalizes the concept of CPN E as defined by Bernheim, Peleg and 
Whinston [3]. For convenience, the notion of C P NE is cast in terms of mixed strategies (members 
of E) instead of strategy profiles (members of 11£=1 Ed. We abuse notation sometimes by writing 
a mixed strategy a E E as (as,a_s), where as E Es. 
Let r = (N, (Ai)iEN' (Ui)iEN) be a game in strategic form. Given a E E and S E 2N\N, S =j:. 0, 
we write rja_s for the game (S,(Ai)iES, (Ui)iES), where for each i E S and as E As we have 
Ui(as) = L i1_s(a_s)ui(as, cLs), 
o<_sEA_s 
For S = N, define rja_s = r. 
The definition of CPN E given by BPW is recursive. 
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Definition BA. Let f = (N, (Ai)iEN' (Ui)iEN) be a game in strategic form. 
(i) If 1N 1= 1, then 0"1 E ~1 is a CPNE if for every 0-1 E ~1 : U1(0"1) ~ U1(0-1)' 
(ii) Assume that C PN E has been defined for games with fewer than n players, and let f be a 
game such that IN 1= n. 
(a) A mixed strategy 0" E ~ is self-enforcing if for every S E 2N\N, S =F 0, o"s is a CPN E of 
f/O"_s. 
(b) A mixed strategy 0" E ~ is a CPN E of f if 0" is a self-enforcing mixed strategy, and if there 
is no other self-enforcing mixed strategy 0- such that for every i EN: Ui(o-) > Ui(O"). 
For every game in strategic form f let CPN E'(f) and CPN E(f) represent the sets of mixed 
strategies satisfying, respectively, definitions B.3 and BA. Also, we denote by SE(f) the set of 
all self-enforcing mixed strategies of f. For each 0" E ~, and each S E 2N , S =F 0, we write 
SEDI1(0", S) for the set of self-enforcing mixed deviations from 0" by coalition S in the game f 
and we denote by Ur (0") the expected utility of player i given mixed strategy 0" in the game f. 
Proposition B.1 can now be stated as follows. 
Proposition B.t. For every game f in strategic form we have CPNE(f) = CPNE'(f). 
Before proving the proposition, we establish two lemmas. 
Lemma B.t. For each f, each fJ E ~ and each SE 2N, S =F 0, we have that 0" =(O"s,fJ-s) E 
SEDI1(fJ, S) if and only if o"s E SEDr;r-S(fJs, S). 
Proof: We prove the lemma by induction on the number of players in S. Let f be a strategic 
form game, fJ E ~ and SE 2N • 
(i) If S = {i}, then SEDIt(fJ, S) = DIt(u, S) = ~s x {u-s} and SEDIj"-s (us, S) = DIji1-S(us, S) = 
~s. Therefore, 0" =(O"s, fJ_s) E SEDf.t(fJ, S) if and only if O"s E SEDr;.P'-S(us, S). 
(ii) Assume Lemma B.1 holds for IS 1< k. We show that it holds for 1S 1= k. 
STEP 1: If O"s E SEDIji1-S(us, S) then 0" =(O"s, fJ-s) E SEDIt(u, S). 
Let 0" = (O"s, u-s) rt. SEDf.t(u, S). Then there are R E 2S\S, R =F 0, and 0- = (o-R, O"S\R, u-s) E 
SEDIt((O"s, u-s), R) such that for each i E R we have UF(o-) > U[(O"). Since 1R 1< k, the induc-
tion hypothesis yields o-R E SED~(i1-S,(1S\R) (O"R' R). Noticing that f /(u-s, O"S\~) == (f/ u-s)/O"S\R, 
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it also yields (aR,CTS\R) E SEDr,j~-S(CTS,R). Moreover,foreachi E RwehaveUf/i1-S(aR,CTs\R) = 
UF(a) > UF(CT) = Uf/ i1- S(CTS). Hence CTS ~ SEDr,ji1-S(o-s,S). 
STEP 2: If (CTS,o-_s) E SEDIt(o-, S) then CTS E SEDIt-S(o-s, S). 
Let CTS ~ SEDr,ji1-S(o-s,S). Then there are R E 2S\S, R =/; 0, and as =(aR,CTS\R) E 
SEDr,ji1-S(CTS, R) such that for each i E R we have uf/i1-S(as) > Uf/ i1- S(CTS). The induction 
hypothesis implies that aR E SED~/i1-s)/US\R( CTR, R). Since (f/ O"-s)/CTS\R = f /(o--s, CTS\R) it 
also implies that a =(aR,CTS\R,o--S) E SEDIt((CTS,o--s),R). Furthermore, for each i E R we have 
UF(a) = uf/i1-S(as) > Uf/ i1- S(CTS) == Uf(CTS,o-_s). Therefore (CTS,o-_S) ~ SEDIt(o-,S).D 
Lemma B.2. Let f be a game in strategic form. For each CT E C P N E'(f) and each S E 2N , 
S =/; 0, we have CTS ECPNE'(f/CT_S). 
Proof: Let CT E ~ be such that CTS rt CPNE'(f/CT_S) for some S E 2N , S =/; 0. We show that 
CT~CP N E'(r). 
Since CTS ~ CPNE'(f/CT_S), then there are S' E 2s , S' =/; 0, and as = (as',CTS\S') E 
SEDIIU-S(CTS, S') such that for each i E S', we have uf/u-S(as) > Uf/u-S(CTS). By Lemma 
B.l, (as/, CTS\S') E SED~IU-S(CTS' S') implies that a == (asl, CTS\S', CT_S) E SEDIt(CT, S'). Moreover, 
for each i E S' we have UF(a) == ur/u-S(as) > ur/u-S(CTS) == Uf(CT). Hence CT ~CPNE'(r).D 
Proof of Proposition B.l: We prove the proposition by induction on the number of players. 
(i) If I N 1= 1 then Proposition B.l clearly holds as for each CTI E ~I, we have SEDIt(CTI, {I}) = ~I' 
(ii) Assume that Proposition B.l is satisfied for games with fewer than n players. We need to show 
that it holds for f with IN 1= n. 
STEP 1: If CT ECPNE(r) then CT ECPNE'(r). 
Let CT ~ CPNE'(r). Then there is as E 2N , S #- 0, and a a = (as,CT_S) E SEDIt(CT,S) such 
that for each i E S, we have UF(a) > UF( CT). 
Case (a): S #- N. Since a E SEDIt(CT, S), by Lemma B.l as E SED'I/u-S(CTS, S). Moreover, 
UF(a) == ur/u-S(as) > ur/u-S(CTs) = Uf(CT) for each i E S. Hence Us rt CPNE'(f/CT_S) == 
CPN E(f /CT_S) where the equality follows from the induction hypothesis and that the game f /CT_S 
has less than n players. Therefore CT 4:.CPN E(r). 
Case (b): S == N. Assume without loss of generality that 1-3 a E SEDIt(CT, N) such that for 
each i EN, Uf(a) > UF(a). Then a ECPNE'(r) and so by Lemma B.2, CTS E.GPNE'(f/u-s) == 
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GPNE(r/u_s) vs E 2N \N, S =/:- 0, where the equality follows from the induction hypothesis. 
Thus,O' E SE(r) and for each i E N, U[(O') > uf(u). Therefore, u ftGPNE(r).  
STEP 2: If u EGPNE'(r) then u EGPNE(r).  
Let u ft GPN E(r). If u ftSE(r), then there is a S E 2N \N, S =/:- 0, such that Us ft 
GPN E(r /u-s) = GPN E'(r /u-s) where the equality follows from the induction hypothesis. But 
Lemma B.2 and Us ft GPNE'(r/u_s) implies that u ft GPNE'(r). 
If u E SE(r), then there is a 0' E SE(r) such that for each i E N, we have Uf(O') > U[(u). 
We show that 0' E SED~(u,N), thereby proving that u ftGPNE'(r). 
Suppose to the contrary that 0' ft SED~(u,N). Since D~(u,N) = E (any deviation by the 
grand coalition is feasible), then there must be a S E 2N \N, S =/:- 0, and a 0- = (o-s,O'-s) E 
SED~(O', S) such that for each i E S : U[(o-) > U[(O'). Since (o-s,O'-s) E SED~(O', S), Lemma 
B.1 yields o-s E SEDr;jii-S(O's,S). Moreover, for each i E S we have UJ/ii-S(o-s) = uf(o-) > 
U[(O') = uF/u-S(O's). Hence Us ft GPNE'(r/O'_s) = GPNE(r/O'_s) where the equality fol-
lows from the induction hypothesis. Therefore 0' ft SE(r). This contradiction establishes the 
proposition. 0 
r-----
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